Abstract. The study of deterministic public-key encryption was initiated by Bellare et al. (CRYPTO '07), who provided the "strongest possible" notion of security for this primitive (called PRIV) and constructions in the random oracle (RO) model. We focus on constructing efficient deterministic encryption schemes without random oracles. To do so, we propose a slightly weaker notion of security, saying that no partial information about encrypted messages should be leaked as long as each message is a-priori hard-to-guess given the others (while PRIV did not have the latter restriction). Nevertheless, we argue that this version seems adequate for many practical applications. We show equivalence of this definition to single-message and indistinguishability-based ones, which are easier to work with. Then we give general constructions of both chosen-plaintext (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext-attack (CCA) secure deterministic encryption schemes, as well as efficient instantiations of them under standard number-theoretic assumptions. Our constructions build on the recently-introduced framework of Peikert and Waters (STOC '08) for constructing CCA-secure probabilistic encryption schemes, extending it to the deterministic-encryption setting as well.
Introduction

Background and Overview
Motivation. Deterministic public-key encryption (where the encryption algorithm is deterministic) was studied by Bellare, Boldyreva and O'Neill [1] . They proposed a semantic-security-style definition of privacy for it, called PRIV, which requires that no partial information about multiple, possibly-dependent messages is leaked from their encryptions, while appropriately taking into account two inherent limitations of deterministic encryption: privacy is only possible for messages that are a-priori hard-to-guess by the adversary, and some information about a message leaks unavoidably, namely its encryption. Both the chosenplaintext (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext-attack (CCA) cases were considered, and the authors designed several constructions meeting them.
Deterministic encryption seems interesting and useful. As discussed in [1] , it allows for fast searching on encrypted data; moreover, deterministic encryption can be length-preserving, which can be needed for securing legacy code or in bandwidth-critical applications. Finally, we find that the study of deterministic encryption can have applications to normal (randomized) encryption as well.
However, the constructions of [1] are only proven secure in the random oracle (RO) model [4] . Of course, finding alternative schemes secure in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles) is desirable, as a growing number of papers have raised concerns about the "soundness" of the RO model (e.g. [8, 22, 2] to name a few). Finding deterministic encryption schemes secure in the standard model was left as an important open problem in [1] . This paper. We construct efficient deterministic encryption schemes without random oracles, secure under standard number-theoretic assumptions. The notion of security we use, however, is slightly weaker than that of [1] , in that it considers the encryption of block-sources. That is, it guarantees no partial information about encrypted messages is leaked, as long as each message is a-priori hard-to-guess given the other messages. We believe this notion to nevertheless be suitable for a variety of practical applications, for example the encryption high-entropy data containing social security or phone numbers. In such examples, messages can depend on one another, e.g. share a common prefix, yet the foregoing condition is satisfied.
Related work. The encryption of high-entropy sources was first considered in the information-theoretic, symmetric-key setting by Russell and Wang [28] , and the problem was studied in greater generality (under the name "entropic security") by Dodis and Smith [20, 19] . Entropic security was later studied in the quantum setting by Desrosiers and Dupuis [16, 17] .
Main Results
Equivalent Definitions. We show that PRIV-security for block-sources is equivalent to PRIV-security for a single hard-to-guess message. The latter was briefly introduced (using a slightly different formulation) in [1] under the name PRIV1, where it was shown strictly weaker than PRIV, but beyond that this notion remained unstudied. We also show equivalence of PRIV1 to a singlemessage, indistinguishability-based notion, which is handier to work with. The proof is non-trivial and employs ideas from [20] and [16, 17] , used for showing the equivalence between entropic security for information-theoretic symmetrickey (quantum) encryption schemes and an indistinguishability-based notion. All our results about the definitions extend to the CCA setting as well.
General constructions. We present general constructions of both CPAand CCA-secure deterministic encryption schemes, building on the recentlyintroduced framework of Peikert and Waters [26] for constructing (randomized) IND-CCA encryption schemes in the standard model. Recall that [26] introduces a framework of "lossy" trapdoor functions (TDFs) -TDFs that operate in one two possible "modes," an injective one and an un-invertible lossy one, for which the outputs are indistinguishable. We observe that if the lossy mode also acts as a universal hash function [9, 10] (in which case we say it has a universal hash mode), then the lossy TDF in injective mode is in fact a secure deterministic encryption scheme in our sense. Indeed, this follows straightforwardly under our indistinguishability-based security notion by the Leftover-Hash Lemma (LHL) [23, 6] . We extend the connection between lossy TDFs and deterministic encryption schemes to the CCA setting as well: our general CCA-secure construction can be viewed as a "deterministic" version of the general IND-CCA scheme of [26] . Unlike the latter it does not use a one-time signature scheme but rather a hash function H that is both target-collision resistant (TCR) [24, 5] and universal. It also uses a lossy TDF F and an all-but-one (ABO) TDF G (the latter is a generalization of the former introduced in [26] whose first input is drawn from a set of branches, one of which is lossy), where as before lossiness must be strengthened to universality. The encryption of message m under our scheme has the form (H(m),
DDH-based instantiations. We obtain instantiations of our general constructions based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) rather straightforwardly. In fact, we show that the DDH-based lossy and ABO TDF constructs of [26] already suffice; that is, they indeed have "universal" lossy modes. To construct an appropriate hash function for our CCA-secure scheme, we use the discrete-log-based, collision-resistant (and thus TCR) construct of [11] and show that it is also universal. However, some care needs to be taken about its choice of parameters, because the range of the hash must be "compatible" with the ABO TDF in our construction. Nevertheless, we demonstrate ways to achieve compatibility for two popular choices of groups where DDH is believed hard.
Extending our general constructions. While our DDH-based instantiations fit neatly into a conceptual framework of "deterministic encryption with universal hash mode," they are not particularly efficient. Moreover, the other instantiations of lossy and ABO TDFs in [26] do not (at least immediately) give universal lossy modes. Our solution to this problem is to extend our general constructions in an efficient way such that the extra universality requirement on the underlying primitives is eliminated. These extensions derive from a novel application of a "crooked" version of the LHL due to Dodis and Smith [19] , which tells us that if one applies an invertible, pairwise-independent hash function (e.g. the usual H a,b (x) = ax + b construct over a finite field) to a message before encrypting it under our general constructions, then "lossiness" of the underlying primitives (in addition to TCR for hash function H in the CCA case) alone suffices for security.
Efficient Paillier-based schemes. In particular, the above extensions allow us to instantiate our schemes using the "more-efficient" Paillier-based [25] lossy and ABO TDFs of [26] . However, these constructs are still far from optimal.
Borrowing a technique of Damgård and Nielsen [14, 15] , we devise new Paillierbased constructs of lossy and ABO TDFs having public-key size on the order of (instead of quadratic in) the message length and essentially no ciphertext expansion; moreover, they compare to standard Paillier encryption computationally. In order to encrypt messages with potentially-small min-entropy (relative to the length of a message), our constructs actually use a generalization of Paillier's scheme due to Damgård and Jurik [13] . Under this generalization, we also construct a hash function for H in the extended CCA-secure construction that is provably TCR based on the same assumption (decisional composite residuosity), and whose range is compatible with the ABO scheme. However, for practical efficiency one can instead use a TCR cryptographic hash function such as SHA256 or the constructs of [5, 29] for H. This is in fact another pleasing consequence of extending our general constructions, since before H was required to be both TCR and universal, which seems to preclude using a cryptographic hash function.
Concurrent Work
Concurrently and independently, Bellare, Fischlin, O'Neill and Ristenpart [3] define several multi-message, semantic-security-style definitions for deterministic encryption and prove them equivalent to PRIV definition of [1] . They also propose and prove equivalent an indistinguishability-based definition, but their proof techniques are different from ours. Namely, they consider an "intermediate" definitional variant that we do not. Also, they propose a new deterministic encryption scheme based on general assumptions, whereas our constructions are based on number-theoretic assumptions and are efficient. No constructions secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks are given in [3] .
Our efficient Paillier-based instantiations of lossy and ABO TDFs were independently discovered by [27] .
Preliminaries
Algorithms, probabilities and sources. Algorithms implicitly take as additional input the unary encoding 1 k of the security parameter k; they may be randomized and must run in poly-time in k unless indicated otherwise. Integer parameters are also implicitly polynomial functions of k. Adversaries are nonuniform and as such receive an auxiliary input of polynomial-size in k, which we also usually leave implicit. For a random variable Y , we write y $ ← Y to denote that y is sampled according to Y 's distribution; furthermore, for an algorithm A, by y $ ← A(x) we mean that A is executed on input x and the output is assigned to y. (In the case that A gets no input we slightly abuse notation and write y When more convenient, we use the following probability-theoretic notation instead. We write P X for the distribution of random variable X and P X (x) for the probability that X puts on value x, i.e. P X (x) = Pr[X = x]. Similarly, we write P X|E for the probability distribution of X conditioned on event E, and P XY for the joint distribution of random variables X, Y . The statistical distance between X and Y is given by Δ(X, Y ) = 1 2
is at most then any (even computationally unbounded) adversary A has advantage at most in distinguishing X from Y .
The min-entropy of a random variable X is H ∞ (X) = − log(max x P X (x)). The worst-case conditional min-entropy of X given Y is defined as H ∞ (X|Y ) = − log(max x,y P X|Y =y (x)), and the average conditional min-entropy of X given
A value ν ∈ R depending on k is called negligible if its absolute value goes to 0 faster than any polynomial in
Public-key encryption. An encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms AE = (K, E, D), satisfying the usual syntax except that for convenience we also give the decryption algorithm D the public key. For simplicity, we only consider a message-space of {0, 1} , and we say that AE is an -bit encryption scheme if for all messages in the message space {0, 1}
is negligible. We say that AE is deterministic if E is deterministic. Note that we require the message-space to depend only on the security parameter and not on the specific public key; as in [1] this is somewhat crucial to our security definitions.
Hashing. An -bit hash function H = (K, H) with domain {0, 1} consists of a key-generation algorithm and a hash algorithm. 1 Again, we omit the well-known syntax and restrict to domain {0, 1} for simplicity. We say H has a 2 r -bounded hash range if its range R = {H(K, x) | K ∈ K, x ∈ D} is bounded by |R| ≤ 2 r in size. We say that H with range R is universal if for all
and we say it is pairwise-independent if for all x 1 = x 2 ∈ {0, 1} and all
We say H is collision-resistant (CR) if for every poly-time A the CR-advantage
1 Note that we are not only interested in "compressing" hash functions, e.g. images and pre-images might have the same bit-length.
is negligible. Similarly, we say H is target-collision resistant (TCR) if for every poly-time A the TCR-advantage
is negligible. As discussed in [5] TCR has some potential benefits over CR, such as being easier to achieve and allowing for shorter output lengths.
Security Definitions
The PRIV notion of security for deterministic encryption introduced in [1] asks that it be hard to guess any partial information 2 of a list of messages given their encryptions, as long as the list has component-wise high (super-logarithmic) min-entropy. We introduce a slight weakening of this notion where each message must have high min-entropy conditioned on values of the other messages. This notion seems to nevertheless suffice in some practical applications, for example in the encryption of high-entropy data containing phone or social security numbers that can share prefixes but are otherwise uncorrelated. We then consider two other security definitions in order of increasing simplicity and ease-of-use; in the next section we prove that they are all equivalent.
PRIV for block-sources. The following is a semantic-security-style definition that considers the encryption of multiple messages under the same public-key. For an -bit encryption scheme AE = (K, E, D) and list m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) of messages, we write E(pk, m) below as shorthand for (E(pk, m 1 ), . . . , E(pk, m n )).
Definition 1. An -bit encryption scheme
n → {0, 1} * and all poly-time adversaries A, the PRIV-advantage
is negligible, where
A single-message definition. Consider Definition 1 with the restriction that only (t, )-block-sources of length n = 1 are allowed; that is, a (t, )-source M replaces block-source M in the definition. Call the resulting notion PRIV1-security for (t, )-sources, where we define Real AE (A, f, M ) and Ideal AE (A, f, M ) as well as the PRIV1-advantage Adv priv1 AE (A, f, M ) accordingly. We note that (an alternative formulation of) PRIV1 was already considered in [1] , and it was shown to be strictly weaker than their multi-message notion PRIV. We will show that in the setting of block-sources the single-and multimessage definitions are equivalent.
An indistinguishability-based formulation. We also consider the following indistinguishability-based formulation of PRIV1 inspired by [20] , which is handier to work with. It asks that it be hard to distinguish the encryptions of two plaintexts, each drawn from a different (public-key-independent) highentropy distribution on the message-space. 
is negligible, where for b ∈ {0, 1}
We note that concurrently and independently, [3] gives an indistinguishabilitybased formulation of the multi-message PRIV definition from [1] (that does not restrict to block-sources).
Extension to chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). For simplicity, the presented definitions only consider the case of chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA).
3 To extend the definitions to the chosen-ciphertext-attack (CCA) setting, we can additionally provide the adversary A in each definition with access to decryption oracle D(pk, sk, ·), which it may query on any ciphertext not appearing in its input. We denote the resulting notions with "-CCA" (e.g. PRIV-CCA for block-sources). Our equivalence results in the following also hold in the CCA setting.
Remark 1. The PRIV definition (and similarly the PRIV1 definition) in [1] requires the pair (m, s) of message-list m and partial-information s on m to be poly-time samplable. We do not have such restrictions in our definitions. On the other hand, we ask s to be a deterministic function s = f (m) of m; this latter restriction, however, is without loss of generality, as we argue in Remark 1 below (as long as we allow f to be unbounded). Thus, our definitions remain at least as strong as their corresponding formulations in the style of [1] . The reason for omitting samplability restrictions is for generality and to simplify our results and proofs, and because they are actually not required for the security of our constructions. Furthermore, this strengthening of the definitions is not crucial for our equivalence results; see Remark 4.
Remark 2. PRIV1 (similarly PRIV for block-sources) remains equivalent if we allow f to be randomized; i.e., on input m the function f is evaluated as f (m; r) for r chosen independently according to some fixed probability distribution (typically uniform) on a finite domain. This equivalence holds for both the "private seed" model, where adversary A does not learn r, and the "public coin" model, where r is given to A (or in a combination of the two). Indeed, if for some adversary, randomized function and block-source, the advantage of A is in absolute value lower-bounded by ε on average over the random choice of r, then the same lower-bound holds for some specific choice of r. (The other direction is trivial.)
Note that the "private seed" model covers the case, similar to [1] , where a message-and-partial-info pair (m, s) is chosen according to an arbitrary joint probability distribution P MS (with H ∞ (M ) ≥ t and a finite domain for s), as we can always understand the message m as instead sampled according to its distribution P M and then the partial-information s computed with conditional distribution P S|M=m by means of a randomized function (which can always be done since we do not require f to be efficient 4 ). Thus, if in the "private seed" model we restrict the message-and-partial-info pair to be poly-time samplable, then our PRIV1 definition is equivalent to that from [1] .
Remark 3. It also suffices in the above definitions to consider predicates f , i.e., binary functions to {0, 1}. This actually follows from Lemma 3 of [16] (and verifying that their proof also works in our poly-time-adversary setting). The idea is to consider the Goldreich-Levin (i.e. inner-product) predicate of the partial information with a random string, and use Remark 2. The resulting adversary loses a factor 2 in its advantage and its running-time increases by O(n ). (The technique also works for definitions in the style of [1] ; i.e., it suffices to consider partial information of length 1 there.)
Equivalence of the Definitions
We show that all three definitions, namely PRIV for block-sources, PRIV1 and PRIV1-IND, are equivalent. Our strategy is as follows. We take PRIV1 as our starting point, and we first show that it is equivalent to PRIV1-IND. Later we show that it is also equivalent to PRIV for block-sources.
Theorem 1. Let AE be an -bit encryption scheme. Then for any (t, )-sources M 0 , M 1 and any adversary A, there exists a (t, )-source M , an adversary B and a function f such that
and the running-time of B is that of A. And, for any (t + 1, )-source M , any function f and any adversary A, there exists an adversary B and (t, )-sources
and the running-time of B is that of A plus O( ).
The proof borrows and combines ideas from [20] and [16, 17] , used for showing the equivalence between entropical security for information-theoretic symmetric (quantum) encryption schemes and an indistinguishability-based notion.
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The proof of the first claim relies on Remark 2 and is straightforward, since distinguishing M 0 , M 1 given their encryptions is equivalent to guessing b from the encryption of M b where b is a random bit. For the second claim, note that if f (M ) is easy-to-guess given the encryption of M , then M conditioned on f (M ) = 0 and M conditioned on f (M ) = 1 are easy to distinguish. However, one of these distributions may have much smaller min-entropy than M (if f is unbalanced). To avoid (almost all of) this entropy loss we can "mix" them appropriately with M . Moreover, the resulting distributions become poly-time samplable if the pair (M, f (M )) is (see Remark 4).
Proof. We start with the first claim. Let M 0 , M 1 and A be as given. Let M to be the balanced "mixture" of M 0 and M 1 , and f be the corresponding "indicator function;" i.e., M is sampled by choosing a random bit b and then outputting m sampled according to M b , and the partial information f (m) is defined as b. Such a joint probability distribution on m and b is allowed by Remark 2. Let B be the PRIV1-adversary that on inputs pk, c runs A on the same inputs and outputs the result. Then H ∞ (M ) ≥ t and we have
this proves the first claim. For the second claim, let A, f, M be as given. We first note that by Remark 3, we may assume that f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, at the cost of losing at most a factor 2 in A's advantage and increasing its running-time by O( ). Consider the independent random variables M 0 and M 1 , with respective distributions
and similarly 
, where P K describes a public key generated by K. 6 We have
where the second equality is by construction. Note that P Y0 = r 0 P Y |f (M)=0 + r 1 P Y and similarly for P Y1 . It follows that
where M is an independent identically-distributed copy of M . Note that we use r 0 + r 1 = 1 and P Y (0) + P Y (1) = 1 in the third equality and in the secondto-last we use that we can switch the roles of m and m in the definition of Ideal AE (A, f, M ). Substituting into equation (1), we obtain
Taking into account the factor-2 loss, this proves the second claim.
Next, we show that PRIV1 for (t, )-sources implies PRIV for (t, )-block-sources; the reverse implication holds trivially. M, g ) . 6 It makes no difference for the upcoming argument whether we consider the same or a fresh public key for Y , Y0 and Y1.
Furthermore, the running-time of B is at most that of A plus O(n ).
Interestingly, the proof is not a straightforward hybrid argument, but makes intensive use of Theorem 1. The idea is to consider the probability of the adversary A in guessing f (M ) when given the encryption of a list of independent and uniformly distributed messages and compare this both to Ideal AE (A, f, M ) and to Real AE (A, f, M ), making use of hybrid arguments and the PRIV1-IND-security of AE (which follows from its assumed PRIV1-security).
Proof. Let A, M , f be as given. By Remark 3, we may assume that f is binary, at the cost of losing a factor 2 in A's advantage and increasing its running-time by O(n ). Furthermore, we may assume the PRIV1-advantage to be non-negative (otherwise we flip A's output bit). To simplify notation, we write Adv(A) below as shorthand for Adv priv1 AE (A, M , f). Consider the probability
. . , U n ) being n independent copies of the uniform distribution on {0, 1} . Note that we can re-write Adv(A) as
Intuitively, this implies that if Adv(A) is "large" then one of the above two summands must be as well. We show that in either case we can construct a (t, )-source M , a function g and an adversary B as claimed. We start with the latter case. Specifically, suppose that
We construct a PRIV1-IND adversary B with running-time that of A plus O(n ) and two (t, )-sources with resulting PRIV1-IND advantage lower bounded by 2Adv(A)/5n; Theorem 1 then implies the claim (taking into account the factor-2 loss by our initial assumption that f is binary). We use a hybrid argument. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n} consider the probability
(pk, sk)
It follows that there exists a j such that h
AE (A, f, M ) is at least 2Adv(A)/5n. Furthermore, this lower-bound holds for some specific choicesṁ 1 , . . . ,ṁ j of m 1 , . . . m j and some specific choiceṁ of m. We assume for simplicity that f (ṁ) = 1; if it is 0 the argument is similar. This implies that there exists an adversary B, which on inputs pk, c samples u $ ← U and returns E(pk,ṁ 1 ), . . . , E(pk,ṁ j ), c, E(pk, u j+2 ) , . . . , E(pk, u n )) , and two (t, )-sources, namely M j+1 conditioned on M 1 =ṁ 1 , . . . , M j =ṁ j and U j+1 , such that the resulting PRIV1-IND advantage is lower bounded by 2Adv(A)/5n, as required.
A(pk,
We move to the other case, where we have
We use another hybrid argument. Specifically, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} consider the probability E(pk, (m 1 ,..., m i , u i+1 ,. .., u n ))) = f (m) :
Again it follows that there exists a j such that h 2,j+1 (M B , B) where B is a random bit. In the second, note that if the message-and-partial-info pair (M, S), where S is a bit, is poly-time samplable then the following is a poly-time sampler for M 0 (the sampler for M 1 is symmetric): Sample (m, s) and output m if s = 0; else, sample (m , s ) and output m . (Specifically the running-time of the sampler is at most twice that of the original one in this case.) As such, essentially the same proof can be used to obtain equivalence between the multi-message PRIV and IND definitions shown in [3] as well.
Similarly, our proof of Theorem 2 also works when restricting to such polytime samplable message-and-partial-info pairs, where though in the PRIV definition for block-sources we need that (M , S) can be sampled by a poly-time algorithm conditioned on any fixed choice for M 1 , . . . , M j and for any j. Indeed, in the reduction we fix a particular choiceṁ 1 , . . . ,ṁ j for M 1 , . . . , M j (for some j) and construct a PRIV1 adversary based upon the message-and-partial-info pair (M j+1 , S) conditioned on (M 1 , . . . , M j ) = (ṁ 1 , . . . ,ṁ j ). This is poly-time samplable under the above samplability condition on (M , S).
General CPA-and CCA-Secure Constructions
We propose general constructions of deterministic encryption that are CPA-and CCA-secure under our security notions. The constructions derive from an interesting connection between deterministic encryption and "lossy" trapdoor functions introduced by Peikert and Waters [26] . These are trapdoor functions with a (un-invertible) "lossy" mode in which the function loses information about its input, and for which the outputs of the "normal" and "lossy" modes are (computationally) indistinguishable. Viewing trapdoor functions as deterministic encryption schemes in our context, we develop a similar framework of deterministic encryption with hidden hash mode.
CPA-Secure Construction
For our CPA-secure construction, we introduce the following notion.
Deterministic Encryption with Hidden Hash Mode. We say that AE = (K,K, E, D) is a deterministic -bit encryption scheme with hidden hash mode (HHM), or simply HHM deterministic encryption scheme, with a 2 r -bounded hash range if (K, E, D) is an -bit deterministic encryption scheme, and the following conditions are satisfied:
-(AlgorithmK induces a hash.) There is an induced hash function H E = (K, H E ) with domain {0, 1} and a 2 r -bounded hash range, where algorithm K outputspk, and H E on inputspk, m returns E(pk, m). (Typically r .) -(Hard to tellpk from pk.) Any poly-time adversary A has negligible advantage, denoted Adv hhm AE (A), in distinguishing the first outputs ofK and K. The "alternate" key-generation algorithmK is used only for security proofs; we assume it produces only a public key and no secret key. In the case that the induced encryption scheme H E in the first property is universal, we say that scheme AE has a hidden universal-hash mode (HUHM).
HUHM implies CPA-security. We show that a deterministic encryption scheme with hidden universal-hash mode is in fact PRIV-secure for block-sources. In other words, if the lossy mode of a lossy trapdoor function is universal, then it is a CPA-secure deterministic encryption scheme in our sense. 
Furthermore, the running-time of B is that of A.
The idea of the proof is simple: in the experiments for the PRIV1-IND adversary A, the alternate key generation algorithmK of AE may be used instead of K without A being able to tell the difference; then, the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) [23, 6] implies that "encryptions" are essentially uniform, so it is impossible for A to guess from which source the encrypted message originated. (Note that it is not crucial here that the output distribution be uniform, but merely independent of the input distribution.)
Proof. For b ∈ {0, 1}, by definition of Adv
hhm AE , the probability E(pk, m) ). By the universal property of the hash mode and applying the LHL, it follows that the above probability is within of Pr A(pk, c) = 1 :pk
where R denotes the range of the induced hash function H E . But now, this probability does not depend on b anymore, and thus
from which the claim follows by a suitable choice of m.
CCA-Secure Construction
In order to extend the connection between lossy TDFs and deterministic encryption to the CCA setting, we first generalize our notion of deterministic encryption with HHM in a similar way to the all-but-one (ABO) TDF primitive defined in [26] .
All-but-one deterministic encryption. An all-but-one (ABO) deterministic encryption scheme AE = (K, E, D) with a 2 r -bounded hash range is such that each of K, E, D takes an additional input b from an associated branch-set B. In the case that for all b ∈ B the induced hash function H E b in the first condition is universal, we say that scheme AE is universal-ABO.
The construction. For our general CCA-secure construction, we show how to adapt the IND-CCA probabilistic encryption scheme of [26] to the deterministicencryption setting. In particular, our construction does not use a one-time signature scheme as in [26] but rather a TCR hash function.
Let AE hmm = (K hmm , E hmm , D hmm ) be an -bit deterministic encryption scheme with a HHM and a 2 r hmm -bounded hash range, let AE abo = (K abo , E abo , D abo ) be an -bit ABO deterministic encryption scheme with branch set B and a 2 r abo -bounded hash range, and let H tcr = (K tcr , H tcr ) be a -bit hash function with a 2 rtcr -bounded hash range R ⊆ B. Key-generation algorithm K cca of the associated deterministic encryption scheme AE cca = (K cca , E cca , D cca ) runs K tcr , K hhm , and K abo to obtain outputs K tcr , (pk hhm , sk hhm ), (pk abo , sk abo ), respectively; it then returns (K tcr , pk hhm , pk abo ) as public key pk and sk hhm as secret key sk. The encryption and decryption algorithms of are defined as follows:
We show that if the HHM and ABO schemes in fact induce universal hash functions, and hash function H tcr is universal as well, then the construction indeed achieves PRIV-CCA-security for block-sources. The formal proof is in the full paper [7] . The idea is that, in the experiments for the PRIV1-IND-CCA adversary A, we may first replace the input branch to AE abo by the hash (under H TCR ) of "challenge message" m; then, using the secret key of AE abo to answer A's decryption queries, we may replace K hhb by the hash-inducing generatorK hhb . Crucial to this is that A cannot produce a valid decryption query that contains a hash h colliding with the hash h of m, but this is guaranteed by the TCR property of H tcr and the fact that each message has exactly one possible encryption. Now, the only information A sees on m are universal hashes of it. If m has enough min-entropy, then, intuitively, the LHL implies that each of these hashes are close to uniform, independent of the specific distribution of m, bounding A's advantage to be small. One technical subtlety is that although the concatenation of independent instances of universal hash functions is again universal, in our case the universal hash function H E abo coming from the ABO scheme depends (via the branch) on the outcome of the universal hash function H tcr . We overcome this by using the Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma and several observations from [18] .
Application to witness-recovering decryption. We remark that our construction (as well as for that in Section 7), when converted into an IND-CCA probabilistic encryption scheme using the KEM-DEM-style conversion of [3] , 7 yields, to the best of our knowledge, the first such scheme without ROs that is truly witness-recovering; that is, via the decryption process the receiver is able to recover all of the randomness used by a sender to encrypt the message. The constructs of [26] technically do not achieve this since, as the authors note, in their IND-CCA scheme the receiver does not recover the randomness used by the sender to generate a key-pair for the one-time signature scheme.
Schemes Based on DDH
In this section, we give instantiations of our general CPA-and CCA-secure constructions based the well-known decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) in the corresponding groups. The "hidden branches" of the presented HHM and ABO schemes, as well as the TCR hash function in the instantiations are indeed universal, so Theorem 4 applies to show that they are PRIV-CCA-secure for block-sources. (Our CCA-secure construction uses the CPA one as a buildingblock, so we focus on instantiation of the former here.) HHM and ABO schemes. In fact, the deterministic encryption scheme with HUHB and the universal-ABO deterministic encryption schemes are precisely the corresponding DDH-based constructs from [26] of lossy and ABO (with branchset Z p where prime p is the order of group G in which DDH holds) trapdoor functions with 2 k -bounded hash ranges, where k is the bit-size of p. It suffices to observe that the "lossy branches" of these functions are in fact universal. These constructs are recalled in Appendix A, where this observation is justified. Our results demonstrate that these constructs have stronger security properties than were previously known.
Universal-TCR hash. To fully instantiate our CCA-secure construction, it remains to design an -bit hash function whose range is contained in the branch-set Z p of the DDH-based ABO scheme, and which is both universal and TCR (we will call such hashes "universal-TCR"). We accomplish this slightly differently for two popular choices of group G in which DDH is believed to hold, giving rise to two possible concrete instantiations of the construction. Instantiation 1. Let G be a group of prime order p = 2q +1, where q is also prime (i.e. p is a so-called safe prime). Let p have size k. This covers the case of G as an appropriate elliptic-curve group where DDH is hard. Let QR(Z * p ) = {x 2 | x ∈ Z * p } be the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo p. Note that QR(Z * p ) has order (p−1)/2 = q. (Also note that we can sample from QR(Z * p ) by choosing a random x ∈ Z * p and returning x 2 .) In this case we can use the following hash function, based on the general construct from [11] . Define the key-generation and hash algorithms of -bit hash function H 1 = (K 1 , H 1 ) as follows:
Above, x i denotes the i-th bit of string x.
Proposition 1. Hash function H 1 defined above is CR assuming the discretelogarithm problem (DLP) is hard in QR(Z * p ), and is universal with a
The proof is in the full paper [7] . Note that the hardness of the DLP is a weaker assumption than DDH (although it is made in a different group). Instantiation 2. Now let G be QR(Z * p ), where p = 2p + 1 is as before a safe prime, so that |G| = p is also prime. This is another popular class of groups where DDH is believed hard. To instantiate the universal-TCR hash function in this case, we would like to use H 1 from Instantiation 1, but this cannot (immediately) work since QR(Z * p ) is not a subset of Z p . However, we can modify hash algorithm H 1 to output encode(π) instead of π, where encode is an bijection from QR(Z * p ) to Z p . Namely, we can use the "square-root coding" function from [12] :
Here ±π (p +1)/4 are the two square-roots of π, using the fact that for any safe prime p > 5 we have p is congruent to 3 mod 4.
While our DDH-based schemes are a definite proof of concept that secure deterministic encryption can be constructed from a widely-accepted numbertheoretic assumption, they are rather inefficient. In particular, the constructs of [26] follow a "matrix encryption" approach and have public keys with order 2 group elements and ciphertexts with order group elements. We seek more efficient schemes. However, the other instantiations of lossy and ABO TDFs given in [26] do not (immediately) give universal lossy branches. To overcome this difficulty, we first show how to extend our general constructions in an efficient way to provide security when any lossy and ABO TDFs are used.
Extended General Constructions
Generalized "Crooked" LHL. In our security proofs we used the fact that the "lossy modes" of the underlying primitives, unlike those defined in [26] , act as universal hash functions, allowing us to apply the LHL. However, the conclusion of the LHL was actually stronger than we needed, telling us that output of the lossy modes are uniform (and not merely input-independent). We show that the extra universality requirement can actually be avoided, not only for the HHB and ABO schemes but also the TCR hash function, by slightly extending our constructions. The extensions derive from a variant of the LHL due to Dodis and Smith [19, Lemma 12] . We actually need the following generalization of it analogous to the generalization of the standard LHL in [18] . 
The proof is the full version [7] . Intuitively, the lemma says that if we compose a pairwise-independent hash function with any lossy function, the output of the composition is essentially input-independent (but not necessarily uniform), as long as the input has enough (average conditional) min-entropy. This suggests the following extension to our CCA-secure construction. (We treat the CCA case here, since the extension to our CPA-secure construction is evident from it.)
Extended CCA-secure construction. Let E cca = (K cca , E cca , D cca ) be as defined in Section 5.2, and let H pi = (K pi , H pi ) be an -bit invertible pairwiseindependent hash function with range {0, 1} . Invertibility of H pi means that there is a polynomial-time algorithm I such that for all K pi that can be output by K pi and all m ∈ {0, 1} we have I(K pi , H pi (K pi , m)) outputs m. The key-generation algorithm K + cca of the associated composite scheme AE
is the same as K cca except it also generates three independent hash keys K pi,1 , K pi,2 , K pi,3 via K pi which are included in the public key pk. The encryption and decryption algorithms are defined as follows: Decreasing the key size. A potential drawback of the extended CCA-secure scheme is its public-key size, due to including three hash keys for H pi . But in fact we can usually re-use the same key, i.e. take K pi,1 = K pi,2 = K pi,3 . For the security proof to go through, we just need the minor technical condition that the range of the hash function H E abo 9 induced by the lossy branch of the ABO scheme be independent of the particular branch b.This condition is met by all known instantiations. In the proof, this condition allows us to apply Lemma 1 to the "concatenation" of the hash functions H tcr , H hhb and H abo . Details are provided in the full paper [7] .
Advantages. In our extended CCA-secure construction, we can use any lossy and ABO TDF, as defined in [26] . In particular, we can use the Paillier-and lattice-based constructs of [26] , although we obtain even more efficient Paillierbased schemes in the next section. Also, since H tcr in the extended scheme need only be TCR and "lossy," it can be a cryptographic hash function such as SHA256 or the efficient TCR constructs of [5, 29] in practice. (Security of the basic scheme required H tcr to be both TCR and universal, whereas cryptographic hash functions fail to meet the latter.) Such instantiation of H tcr is compatible with any ABO scheme with branch-set B for which {0, 1} n ⊆ B for n sufficiently large (so that the probability of hashing to the "default" lossy branch of the ABO scheme is small). Again, this is satisfied for all known instantiations.
Efficient Schemes Based on Paillier's DCR Assumption
To improve on efficiency over their DDH-based constructs, [26] suggests basing their matrix-encryption approach on Paillier encryption [25] (which uses the group Z N 2 for an RSA modulus N ) instead. One then obtains HHM (or lossy TDF) and ABO schemes with an N -bounded hash range and offering roughly a factor log N savings in public-key and ciphertext size, namely public keys contain order ( / log N ) 2 group elements and ciphertexts order / log N group elements for -bit messages, and for which encryption requires the latter amount of exponentiations. Based on a technique introduced by Damgård and Nielsen [14, 15] , we propose new Paillier-based schemes that use an entirely different (i.e. nonmatrix-encryption-based) approach and have even better efficiency: they are essentially length-preserving, have about -bit public keys, and compare to standard Paillier encryption computationally.
Setting. Let K be an algorithm that outputs (N, (p, q) ) where N = pq and p, q are random k/2-bit primes. Paillier's decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption [25] states that any poly-time adversary A has negligible advantage in distinguishing a from a N mod N 2 for random (N, (p, q)) output by K and random a ∈ Z * N 2 . Let s ≥ 1 be polynomial in k. Our schemes actually use a generalization of Paillier encryption, based on the same assumption, to the group Z N s+1 due to Damgård and Jurik [13] , with some modifications in the spirit of [14, 15] . The schemes have message-space {0, 1} (s+1)(k−1) (i.e. = (s + 1)(k − 1)), where we regard messages as elements of {0, . . . , 2 s(k−1) } × {1, . . . , 2 k−1 +1}, chosen so that it is contained in the "usual" message-space Z N s × Z N for any possible N output by K.
The new deterministic encryption scheme with HHM. Define scheme AE hhm = (K hhm ,K hhm , E hhm , D hhm ) as follows (decryption is specified below):
Return c
Decryption algorithm D hhm on inputs (g, N ), (p, q), c uses standard Paillierdecryption as in [13] to recover x, then computes y by taking the N s -th root of c/g x (which can be done efficiently given p, q) and returns (x, y). The fact that the scheme indeed has a HHM, i.e. that the first outputs of K hhm andK hhm above are indistinguishable, follows under DCR by security of the underlying "randomized" encryption scheme of [13] : g output by K hhm is an encryption of 1 under this scheme andg output byK hhm is an encryption of 0.
Note that the hash range is isomorphic to Z * N , hence the scheme has a 2 kbounded hash range. Also note that the size of this range does not depend on parameter s; in hidden hash mode the encryption function "looses" a 1−1/(s+1) fraction of the information on the plaintext, so by increasing s we can make the scheme arbitrarily (i.e. 1 − o(1)) lossy as defined in [26] . This has some useful consequences. First, it allows to securely encrypt long messages with small min-entropy relative to the length of the message. Second, it permits a purely black-box construction of an ABO scheme with many branches having the same amount of lossiness, via the reduction in [26, Section 3.3] . (The latter applies in the lossy TDF context as well.) However, we obtain a much more efficient ABO scheme directly in the following.
The new ABO deterministic encryption scheme. Define scheme AE abo = (K abo , E abo , D abo ) with branch-set Z N s as follows:
Return ((g, N ), (p, q))
Return c where decryption works essentially as in the previous scheme. A similar analysis shows that under DCR it is indeed an ABO scheme with 2 k -bounded hash range.
TCR hash. To instantiate our extended CCA-secure construction, it remains to specify a TCR hash function with range the branch-set Z N s of the above ABO scheme. One way is to use a "heuristic" cryptographic hash function, as discussed in Section 7. This approach also yields, via the KEM-DEM-style conversion of [3] , a quite efficient, witness-recovering IND-CCA (probabilistic) encryption scheme. However, for completeness, we give below an alternative construction of a provably CR hash function based on the computational analogue of DCR, which dovetails nicely with our ABO scheme for s ≥ 2. We now regard the (s + 1)(k − 1)-bit messages as elements of ( 
Thus, with probability Adv CR (A)/s, A obtaines a N -th root of g i * = h.
Note that the hash function is "compatible" with the above ABO deterministic encryption scheme in that a hash value it produces lies in Z N s as long as s ≥ 2 and the N from the hash function is not larger than the N from the ABO scheme; in fact, it is not too hard to verify that the hash function and the ABO scheme may safely use the same N , so that the latter condition is trivially satisfied.
